Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well being of fellow citizens. Economists, however, have emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self-interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at worst additive. But this need not be the case. Behavioral experiments nd that if reciprocity-minded subjects feel hostility towards free riders and enjoy in icting harm on them, the incentives provided by the anticipated punishment support near e cient levels of contributions to a public good. Cooperation may also be supported if altruistic individuals internalize the group bene ts that their contributions produce. Using a utility function embodying both reciprocity and altruism we show that unconditional altruism attenuates the punishment motive and thus may reduce the level of punishment in icted on defectors, resulting in lower levels of contribution. Increases in altruism may also reduce the level of bene ts from the public project net of contribution costs and punishment costs. The negative e ect of altruism on cooperation and material payo s is greater the stronger is the reciprocity motive among group members.
Introduction
Both altruism and reciprocity may motivate individuals to contribute to the provision of a public good. Altruism induces the individual to unconditionally value the payo of other individuals, while reciprocity implies a valuation of the others' payo s that is conditional on their contributions (or other indications of their type). Reciprocators may value the payo s of low contributors negatively and be motivated to reduce the payo s of defectors at a cost to themselves, when this option is available. The prospect of punishment of low contributions may induce individuals to contribute more than they otherwise would, thereby playing an important role in sustaining cooperation in groups where formal constraints and incentives are insu cient (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles, 2010) .
We explore the possibility that the two motives for contribution a positive valuation of the payo s of others and a desire to avoid the punishment induced by a negative valuation of one's payo s by others may work at cross purposes. Speci cally we show that by attenuating the punishment motive, a general increase in the level of unconditional altruism may reduce rather than increase contributions. Thus, while one often refers to individuals as being`cooperative' or`uncooperative', the motives supporting high levels of cooperation are heterogeneous, and they need not work synergistically. For example, experimental evidence indicates that unconditional altruists are signi cantly less likely to punish low contributors in a public goods game (Carpenter et al., 2009 ): a standard deviation increase in an individual's level of altruism reduced the amount he spent on punishment by 0.13 standard deviations.
A key assumption in our model is that people have an intrinsic motivation to punish shirkers, not simply an instrumental desire to alter their behavior or to a ect the distribution of payo s to either reduce unfairness or to enhance one's own relative payo s. This is similar to what Boyd and Richerson (1992) call retribution punishment and the analogue of Andreoni's (1990) warm glow altruism. That subjects view punishment of shirkers also as retribution rather than simply as instrumental towards a ecting behavior is consistent with the recent public goods with punishment experiment of Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2005) . The game was one shot, ruling out behavior modi cation as a motive for punishing low contributors, and the punishment technology was such that punishment could not alter the di erence in payo between the punisher and the target (the cost to the punisher was the same as that in icted on the target). Nonetheless, sixty per cent of cooperators punished defectors.
Further evidence for our assumption that punishment is non-strategic comes from the public goods experiment of Fudenberg and Pathak (2009) . As in the standard game, following each round of contributions subjects were given information on the contributions of fellow group members and had the opportunity to deduct some of their own payo s in order to lower the payo s of another in the group. But unlike the usual treatment, in which the targets of punishment were informed of the level of punishment received after each round, in the Fudenberg and Pathak experiment the levels of punishment were not revealed until the experiment was over, and those who punished others knew this. Thus the experimental design ruled out modifying the behavior of shirkers as a motive for punishment. Consistent with what the authors term a \pure preference" motivation for punishment, subjects nonetheless punished shirkers, leading the authors to conclude that \agents enjoy punishment, where`enjoyment' includes anger and a desire for retribution." There is considerable further evidence for our non-strategic modeling of punishment (de Quervain et al., 2004; Casari and Luini, 2008; Anderson and Putterman, 2006) .
In the next section we use the ideas of Levine (1998) , Rabin (1993) , and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) to explore the joint e ects of altruism toward fellow group members and reciprocity-based hostility towards low contributors in a public goods game. In section 3 we study the Nash equilibrium levels of punishment and contribution under varying levels of unconditional altruism of the members of a group. We show rst that the relationship between the level of altruism and contributions is non-monotonic, and that under plausible assumptions there exists a range of levels of altruism over which increases in altruism reduce both equilibrium levels of contribution and the sum of bene ts from the public project, net of the costs of contributing and the costs of punishing. Second, we show that the range for which altruism is bad for both cooperation and net bene ts is larger the more reciprocal are the group members. For simplicity of exposition and clarity of the underlying causal mechanisms we initially assume a homogeneous model. In section 4 we extend this model to a heterogeneous population and show that our main results and key insights still hold. In heterogeneous populations we can also show that the greater the frequency of altruistic reciprocators in the population the wider is the range for which increased levels of altruism in their functions will decrease average contributions. In the penultimate section we consider a number of caveats and possible extensions. In the conclusion we suggest some implications for how social preferences may support cooperation despite the sometimes counterproductive e ects of increased altruism and the costly nature of punishment. In the appendix we present the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2.
Similar in spirit to our rst result is the nding of Bernheim and Stark (1988) that increased altruism among two family members in a repeated game setting may be welfarereducing (see also Nakao, 2008; Alger and Weibull, 2009 ). However, our setting is a nonrepeated public goods game rather than a repeated dyadic interaction; and rather than the simple withdrawal of cooperation from a shirking partner, punishment in our model is explicitly modeled as costly to the punisher and motivated by reciprocal preferences. We are thus able to show that altruism and reciprocity { two social preferences thought to contribute to public goods provision { may interact in counter-productive ways. Other than showing that altruism may sometimes have unintended e ects, our model is unrelated to the \Samaritan's dilemma" arising because generous acts may undermine the bene ciaries' incentives for self-improvement (Buchanan, 1975; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988; Bruce and Waldman, 1990) .
Altruism, reciprocity and cooperation
Consider a community of individuals indexed by i = 1; :::; n (n 3) who may contribute to a public project by supplying an amount of e ort e i 2 [0, 1]. The total contributions, P k e k , result in a bene t of q P k e k which is shared equally among individuals in the community, while each individual experiences the quadratic cost of contribution; i.e., We note that the marginal private bene t of contribution is and suppose that 1 n < < 1; 1 n < ensures that full contribution, e i = 1; is socially optimal whereas < 1 means that in the absence of punishment sel sh individuals under-contribute to the public project (e i = < 1).
After contributions have been observed, each individual i can impose a cost on j 6 = i with monetary equivalent s ij at cost c ij (s ij ) to himself. The cost s ij results from public criticism, shunning, ostracism, physical violence, exclusion from desirable side-deals, or another form of harm. We assume c ik is increasing and strictly convex, and c ik (0) = c 0 ik (0) = 0. Hence s i = P k6 =i s ki is the punishment in icted upon i by other community members and c i = P k6 =i c ik (s ik ) is i's cost of punishing others. Individual j's standing as a cooperative member of community, b j , depends on j's level of e ort and the contribution that j makes to the group, which we assume is public knowledge.
Speci cally, we assume b j = 2e j 1; so b j = 1 if j contributes nothing, and b j = 1 if j contributes fully. This means that e j = 1 2 is the point at which i evaluates j's cooperative behavior as neither good nor bad. This point could be shifted to any value between 0 and 1, but the added generality is not illuminating.
To model cooperative behavior with social preferences, we say that individual i's utility depends on his own material payo i , the punishment in icted on i, the cost of punishing others, the payo k to other individuals k 6 = i, and the punishment in icted on others s k according to
where the parameter a i , 1 < a i < 1, is i's level of unconditional altruism if a i > 0 and unconditional spite if a i < 0 and i ; 0 i 1; is the strength of i's reciprocity motive, valuing j's payo s more highly if j conforms to i's concept of good behavior, and conversely (The function is similar to Levine (1998) , but i's evaluation of k's type is here based on k's actions in a particular game, rather than on k's level of altruism). The valuation of others' payo s is weighted by the inverse of the number of other members so that changes in group size do not alter the importance of an individual's own payo s relative to the payo s of others.
The cost to i of punishing j, c ij is increasing in the level of punishment in icted and it may also increase with i's level of altruism due to the discomfort that altruists may experience in punishing fellow group members. In particular, we adopt the following speci c functional form:
Observe that when = 0; (2) reduces to a quadratic function. Note (from (1)) that consistent with our assumption of \retribution punishment", an individual punishing low contributors values the punishment per se rather than the bene ts likely to accrue to the punisher or to others if the shirker responds positively to the punishment. Note that unconditional altruism and the reciprocity-based spite that motivates punishment of low contributors are both forms of altruism as de ned by biologists (assuming that the group bene ts associated with the increased contributions induced by punishment outweigh the costs of punishment).
Individuals acting according to these motives increase average payo s in the group but would enhance their own payo s were they to (respectively) not contribute or forgo punishing low contributors. To avoid semantic confusion, we restrict the term altruism to its unconditional variant.
Altruism versus cooperation?
We model a two-stage optimization process in which individual i selects an e ort level taking account of the e ect of this choice on the punishment in icted on i by other team members. To illustrate the e ect of a general increase in the altruism of all group members clearly, in this section we suppose that individuals in the community are homogenous; i.e., (a i ; i ) = (a; ) for all i. To nd the punishment in icted on i, we rst determine j's decision concerning the punishment of i depending on i's contribution level:
where e j = (e 1 ; ::; e j 1 ; e j+1 ; :::; e n ) and s j; i = (s j1 ; ::; s j;i 1 ; s j;i+1 ; :::; s jn ): Member j's choice of s ji in (3) gives the rst order condition for an interior solution as follows.
This means the marginal cost of punishing is equal to the marginal bene t of reducing i's payo s given j's assessment of i's type, net of the subjective costs of in icting this punishment on i given j's level of unconditional altruism. When > 0 and
member j does not punish. However, if > 0 and e i < e 0 , s ji > 0 and
Note that the level of contribution that i must make to avoid punishment is declining in the level of altruism. (We think it plausible that the level of punishment received, when this is positive, would also vary inversely with the level of altruism in the group; we show below that the results below hold for this case as well) Next individual i decides the level of e ort by taking account of the e ect of his e ort choice on the level of punishment he will receive. Thus member i will choose e i (e i ; a) = arg max e i u i (e i ; e i ; s ij ; s i; j ; s i ):
Equation (6) de nes member i's best e ort response to other's e ort levels, e i = e i (e i ; a).
To nd i's best response explicitly we proceed as follows. When there is no punishment of i, an interior solution e N;i = e N;i (e i ; a) for (6) satis es the following rst order condition (recall b j = 2e j 1):
Thus when no punishment is in icted, i's optimal choice of e i equates the marginal cost of contribution to the direct bene ts to i of contributing to the project, , plus i's valuation on others' material payo s. Similarly when i is subject to punishment (hence e i < e 0 ), the rst order condition for an interior solution e P;i = e P;i (e i ; a) becomes :
Equation (8) requires that i takes account of the e ect of increased contribution in reducing punishment, as well as the marginal costs and bene ts of the project expressed in the nopunishment rst order condition (7). Since
> 0, we see that e P;i (e i ; a) > e N;i (e i ; a); punishment supports a higher contribution level. The amount contributed by i will depend on whether punishment is present or not, and this will depend on the level of unconditional altruism of the members of the group. As Proposition 1 shows, there exist critical values, a and a, such that over the interval between them the best response for member i is to contribute just enough to avoid punishment, the amount declining in the level of altruism.
That is:
Figure 1 illustrates equation (9).
When altruism is lower than a, i is subject to punishments by others so the e ort level is determined by equation (8) and hence may be decreasing or increasing in a. To see this, note that @e P;i @a = 2 (a + 1) +1 ;
which may be negative if and are su ciently large so that the positive e ect of altruism (the increased valuation by i of the other members payo s that are enhanced by i's contributions) is o set by the negative e ect (the increased cost of others punishing i reduces i's is the critical point around which i's behavior is judged to be good or bad. Thus when the private marginal bene t of contribution, , is small, so that a sel sh individual is motivated to be a bad type (i.e. when < : For < 0 ; we can nd a and a such that de da < 0 for a < a < a where e is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore we have
Proof. See appendix.
Note that the proposition holds for = 0 (altruism does not a ect the cost of punishing).
The second part of proposition that the range over which altruism has a negative e ect is increasing in the degree of reciprocity occurs because the stronger reciprocity motive is, the bigger is the gap between best responses with and without punishment. From > 1 4 2 we have a < 0, so contributions are declining in not only over the range of positive but also over some range of reductions in spite. Note that while increases in altruism for values of a above a increase the bene ts of the public project net of contribution costs and punishment costs, the reverse is true in the`altruism unambiguously bad for cooperation' range. Here punishment costs are zero, but increases in altruism reduce contributions to the public good, thus lowering the net bene ts. For values of a less than a net bene ts of the project increase in the level of altruism if contributions also increase. But if contributions are declining in a, then net bene ts may either increase or decrease in the level of altruism.
A Heterogenous Population
We again consider a population consisting of n individuals, but each can be either an altruistic reciprocator or a sel sh individual. So parameters describing an individual type (a i ; i ) can be either (a; ) (an altruistic reciprocator) or (0; 0) (a sel sh individual). We denote the fraction of altruistic reciprocators in the population by ; where 2 k n : k = 0; ; n ; so there are n altruistic-reciprocators and (1 )n sel sh individuals. We order the indexing of individuals so that
The choice of punishment level at the second stage is given by for j n s ji (e i ) =
) if e i 1 2 a 2 0 otherwise ; for j > n s ji (e i ) = 0; so an altruistic-reciprocators (j n) punishes an individual i when the e ort of i is low, while a sel sh individual never engages in punishment. We retain the quadratic function for the cost of punishment to simplify the exposition; i.e., c(e i ) = 1 2
When an altruistic reciprocator i is subject to punishment, the rst order condition for an interior solution e R i is given by
Thus when an altruistic reciprocator i considers a marginal increase in contribution, i will take account of the productivity of the project ; the valuation of others' bene ts derived from social preference ( n 1 n 1 (a )); bene ts by inducing higher contributions of others ( 2 n 1 P k6 =i e k ), and the reduction of punishment (
2 ). We note that when = 1 (a homogeneous population of altruistic reciprocators) (10) reproduces (8). The expression for the case of no punishment can be found by simply dropping the last term in the right hand side of (10). By contrast, for the case of a sel sh individual j, the rst order condition for an interior solution e Note again that when = 0, the contribution by a sel sh individual j is solely determined by the material bene t of the project, : In this way, the current heterogeneous population model generalizes the one in section 3 as well as incorporates as a special case the classical public goods game where no social preferences and punishment are considered.
To nd an equilibrium contribution by each type, we use the same method as in section 3, and infer that the equilibrium pro le for each type would be given by the relationships described in the gure 2. This turns out to be indeed the case under the plausible ranges of parameters, as the following proposition shows. (1 )+2) +(1+3 ) 1: Then for the su ciently large n; there exists a R ; a S ; a R ; and a S such that equilibrium e ort is given by Figure 2 . Furthermore, the interval [a R ; a S ] becomes larger as increases.
Proposition 2 con rms that our intuition obtained from the analysis of section 3 remains valid for the heterogenous population. Note that when = 1 proposition 1 in section 3 holds, and so proposition 2 asserts that as long as there are some fraction of altruistic reciprocators in the population ( 3 10 < ), an increase in altruism among altruistic reciprocators will be counter-productive at some range of a: The \altruism bad for cooperation" range of values of a increases when the population share of reciprocal altruists increase for the following reason.
An increase in the fraction of the population who are reciprocal altruists has no e ect on the upper limit of the range for which increase altruism reduces e ort, a S , namely, the level of altruism above which both sel sh and reciprocal agents provide more than enough e ort to avoid punishment; but it reduces a R , the least level of altruism for which this altruism-bad e ect holds. The reason why this is so is that (for any given level of altruism) an increase in the degree of altruistic preferences among the reciprocators raises the level of e ort that reciprocal agents provide when they are subject to punishment, and thereby reduces the level of altruism for which the no-punishment threshold is a binding, as shown in Figure 3 . 
Caveats and Extensions
We do not explore the conceptually challenging e ect of an increase in altruism on subjective welfare, given that the change in altruism is itself a change in preferences (Bergstrom, 2006) analogous to a free resource allowing costless increases in subjective well being. Nor do we address the hypothesis that if incentive mechanisms other than peer punishment were allowed, a general increase in altruism could support more e cient outcomes. If the set of alternative mechanisms is unrestricted, the hypothesis is trivially the case (subsidizing contributions in a complete information setting would achieve this) and we can think of no non-arbitrary way to expand the set of alternative mechanisms while retaining the underlying problems of public goods provision.
Our representation of the motive for punishment -hostility toward those who violate cooperative norms -could be expanded so that the extent of hostility is enhanced by feelings of altruism towards those that the defector has harmed. In this case a general increase in altruism would (as in the current model) make individuals more reluctant to harm defectors, but it would also increase hostility toward defectors, thereby possibly o setting the rst e ect. Finally, had we assumed a sophisticated instrumental behavior modi cation motive for punishing others, increased altruism might (but need not) enhance punishment and contributions. The reason is that in this (we think empirically implausible)`strategic punishing' model, the prospective punisher takes account of the other members' prospective gains resulting from the reduced costs of punishment that they will bear given the target's expected positive contribution response to the punishment. For su cient levels of altruism these gains might outweigh the negative e ect of altruism on the non-strategic punishment motive.
An interesting extension of our treatment of heterogeneous populations would de-link altruism and reciprocity so that there could be two new behavioral types in addition to the altruistic reciprocators and the entirely self interested agents studied here, namely altruistic non reciprocators (a i > 0; i = 0 in equation (1)) and reciprocating non altruists (a i = 0, i > 0). Then, if the traits "altruistic" and "reciprocal" are limited in supply, voluntary public goods provision may be greater if individuals have one or the other trait but not both, and that under these conditions an increase in the degree of altruism has unambiguously positive e ects. The reason is that if altruists are never also reciprocal, then altruism cannot attenuate the motive to punish free riders. Further, reciprocators might punish the altruists as free riders on their civic-minded punishment of self-interested defectors. Analysis of the many possible equilibria for this problem is quite complex and depends critically on the extent of public and private information and the availability of a common culture or other coordinating mechanisms. We suspect that under plausible assumptions, relatively homogeneous sub-populations might outperform mixed populations, and hence might be favored in the process of group formation and the evolution of cultures. But we have not studied this case in detail.
Conclusion
Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well-being of fellow citizens. Economists, however, have emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self-interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at worst additive. It is now recognized that this assumption may fail where the presence of monetary or other explicit incentives reduces the salience of altruistic or other publicspirited motives Tirole, 2003, 2006; Bowles, 2008; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Sliwka, 2007; Bowles and Hwang, 2008) . But as we have seen, the assumption that the e ects of incentives and social preferences are at worst additive need not hold even in the absence of such motivational crowding out (as in our model).
Our results suggest that for a community wishing to sustain high levels of cooperation, e orts to enhance unconditional altruism may be counter-productive and that enhancing the level of citizen reciprocity may exacerbate the negative e ects of altruism. But punishment may also be counter-productive. By de nition acts of altruism increase the joint surplus of the community; but punishment is often (as in our model) resource-using. Unless or until levels of contribution su cient to make punishment rare are achieved, the costs associated with punishment of low contributors may more than o set the gains to cooperation that the punishment allows (Herrmann and Gaechter, 2008; Gaechter et al., 2008) . This is particularly true in a case we have not considered, namely when vendetta-like cycles of punishment and counter punishment are allowed (Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2006) . Nonetheless, cooperation sustained by a combination of altruism and reciprocity-based punishment may be welfare enhancing. This is true in part because punishment is not only an incentive; it is also a signal. The incentive-based response to punishment may be enhanced by the feelings of shame that punishment by peers triggers (Bowles and Gintis, 2005) . In part for this reason disapproval by peers may induce members to contribute even when it is expressed in non-resource-using ways such as gossip, ridicule or the simple statement that the individual has violated a norm (Masclet et al., 2003; Barr, 2001; Wiessner, 2005) .
Appendix A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We rst nd e = e(a) such that e = e P;i (e; a) :
:
We let 0 = 3; < 0 ; and h(a) := e(a) 1 2 ( a). Then we de ne a satisfying h(a) = 0 and h 0 (a) > 0:
Such a exists since our assumptions ensure that the minimum of h(a) occurs at a < , h( ) < 0, and h(0) > 0. Then we see that a satis es < a and e(a) < 1 2 ( a) for < a < a
Similarly we nd such that e = e N;i ( e; a) :
e(a) = 1 2 a + (1 ) 1 2
We de ne a such that e( a) 1 2 ( a) = 0; so a = (1 2 ): By our choices of a and a, we have 1 < < a < a < < 1 . Now if a < a then e < 1 2 ( a) = e 0 < 1. Hence when a < a, e becomes a Nash equilibrium. Then for a > a > 0, e > 1 2 ( a) = e 0 . Thus minf e; 1g becomes a Nash equilibrium. Finally if a < a < a, then e < e 0 <e thus
becomes a Nash equilibrium. From this the rst part of proposition follows. We summarize this result as follows:
min f e(a); 1g if a < a < :
Concerning the second part of the claim, by di erentiating h(a) = 0 with respect to we
Since a < 0 and < NP:
Note that from the hypothesis we have the following stability condition:
Also we have
since < 1: Thus from (A.1) we have e R i j NSPR > e S i j NSPR ; so the NSPR case does not occur at equilibrium. We note that for altruistic reciprocators, e R i j NP < e R i j PS < e R i j PA :
Next we nd the condition under which the sel sh type is not punished. This case occurs if a sel sh individual's contribution is greater than the threshold level of e ort:
On the other hand when a is su ciently low, an increase in a does not a ect the e ort level of a sel sh individual. This happens if
So we have
To nd the equilibrium contribution by altruistic reciprocator we de ne a R and a R such that Figure A .4 shows possible values of a S ; a S ; a R ; and a R . Recall that in the PS case only the sel sh type is punished, so the line e R j PS is only meaningful when a 2 (a S ; a S ): In gure A.4
the intersection between e R j PS and the punishment threshold ( 1 2 ( a)) is located at the right side of a S , so e R j PS < e S j PS for all a < a S and this, in turn, implies that the altruistic reciprocator type, as well as the sel sh type, is subject to punishment. However this is impossible by our de nition of the PS case. Therefore the situation where the altruisticreciprocator type chooses e R j PS (a) does not occur at equilibrium; i.e., the line e R j PS (a) is non-binding at equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium pro le in gure A.4 provides equilibrium contributions depicted by gure 2 in the text. To prove proposition 2, we rst de ne the e ort levels of altruistic reciprocators at equilibrium, e R (a); when the equilibrium pro le is given by gure A.4:
2 ) if a < a R ; n(1 2 ) + 2 1 > n(1 2 ) + 2 1 = (n 1)(1 2 ) > 0, so we have < e ; 2 2 + 2 < 2:
We choose n such that n > 2: Then and by di erentiating the terms in the parenthesis in (A.7) with respect to , we nd that @ @ (ii) = n n 1 (a ) n n 1 2 2 + n 2 (n 1) 2 (1 2 )(2 ) 2 + n n 1 2 n n 1 2 n n 1 n n 1 2 
